Currently, the best and only evidence of the security of the OAEP encryption scheme is a proof in the contentious random oracle model. Here we give further arguments in support of the security of OAEP. We first show that partial instantiations, where one of the two random oracles used in OAEP is instantiated by a function family, can be provably secure (still in the random oracle model). For various security statements about OAEP we specify sufficient conditions for the instantiating function families that, in some cases, are realizable through standard cryptographic primitives and, in other cases, may currently not be known to be achievable but appear moderate and plausible. Furthermore, we give the first non-trivial security result about fully instantiated OAEP in the standard model, where both oracles are instantiated simultaneously. Namely, we show that instantiating both random oracles in OAEP by modest functions implies non-malleability under chosen plaintext attacks for random messages. We also discuss the implications, especially of the full instantiation result, to the usage of OAEP for secure hybird encryption (as required in SSL/TLS, for example).
Introduction
OAEP is one of the most known and widely deployed asymmetric encryption schemes. It was designed by Bellare and Rogaway [5] as a scheme based on a trapdoor permutation such as RSA. OAEP is standardized in RSA's PKCS #1 v2.1 and is part of the ANSI X9.44, IEEE P1363, ISO 18033-2 and SET standards. The encryption algorithm of OAEP G,H [F ] takes a public key f , which is an instance of a trapdoor permutation family F , and a message M , picks r at random and computes the ciphertext C = f (s||t) for s = G(r) ⊕ M ||0 k1 and t = H(s) ⊕ r, where G and H are some hash functions. Despite its importance the only security results for OAEP are a proof of IND-CPA security assuming F is a one-way trapdoor permutation family [5] and a proof of IND-CCA2 security assuming F is partial one-way [15] , both in the random oracle (RO) model, i.e., where G and H are idealized and modeled as random oracles [4] . However, such proofs merely provide heuristic evidence that breaking the scheme may be hard in reality (when the random oracles are instantiated with real functions).
A growing number of papers raised concerns regarding soundness of the controversial random oracle model [11, 18, 19, 16, 1, 13, 9, 20] . Moreover, most of the recent results question security of the practical schemes known to be secure in the RO model. For example, Dodis et al. [13] showed some evidence that the RSA Full Domain Hash signature scheme may not be secure in the standard model. Boldyreva and Fischlin [9] showed that even presumably strong candidates like perfectly one-way hash functions (POWHFs) [10, 12] are insufficient to prove security of partial instantiations of OAEP (when only one of the two random oracles is instantiated with an instance of a POWHF).
The motivation of this work is to gather evidence of soundness of the OAEP design. Like the aforementioned works our goal is to go beyond the classical RO heuristic and study security of the scheme when one or all of its ROs are instantiated. Positive results in the direction of partial instantiations would give further evidence that breaking OAEP for good instantiations is hard, because breaking the scheme would then require to exploit interdependent weaknesses between the instantiations or the family F . Given the negative results of [9] it is unlikely to expect that the properties needed from the instantiating function families are weak or even easily realizable, even if one accepts weaker security stipulations than chosen-ciphertext security for partial or full instantiations. For example, although it seems plausible, it is currently not even known whether OAEP can be proven IND-CPA secure in the standard model assuming any reasonable properties of the instantiating functions.
Here we show that security proofs for instantiations of OAEP are indeed possible. For various security statements about OAEP we specify sufficient conditions on G and H that are certainly weaker than assuming that the functions behave as random oracles, yielding "positive" security statements regarding partially instantiated OAEP. Furthermore, we give the first non-trivial security results about fully instantiated OAEP in the standard model, where both oracles G and H are instantiated simultaneously. We next discuss these results in more detail.
The OAEP Framework. For better comprehension of our technical results we first reconsider the OAEP encryption scheme from a more abstract viewpoint. Let f be a random instance of a partial one-way trapdoor permutation family F , and the encryption algorithm computes a ciphertext as C = f (s||t). Partial onewayness [15] requires that it is hard to find the leading part of the pre-image s||t under f and to output, say, s only. If we consider now for example a family F t-clear where each function is defined as f ≡ g||ID such that f (s||t) = g(s)||t for a trapdoor permutation g, then this family F t-clear is clearly partial one-way (and also a trapdoor permutation). Hence, this example describes a special case OAEP G,H [F t-clear ] for the partial one-way trapdoor permutation family F t-clear where each function outputs the t-part in clear. In particular, the security proof in the random oracle model for OAEP and general partial one-way families (including RSA as a special case) [15] carries over, but we outdo this by giving positive results of partial instantiation for such families F t-clear .
Towards the standard-model security results for fully instantiated OAEP we take the above viewpoint one step further and look at OAEP G,H [F lsb||t-clear ] for families F lsb||t-clear where each function f outputs the k 1 least significant bits of s = G(r) ⊕ M ||0 k1 (which equal those bits of G(r)) and t in clear. Since each function in F lsb||t-clear is also a member in F t-clear the partial instantiation results above remain true for OAEP G,H [F lsb||t-clear ].
We note that security of partial instantiations of OAEP for qualified partial one-way trapdoor families, also have implications for the popular OAEP G,H [RSA] case. They show that any successful attacks on instantiations for RSA would have to take advantage of specific properties of the RSA function. Generic attacks which would also work for F t-clear or F lsb||t-clear are then ruled out. malleable pseudorandom generators, where a given image of a seed r should not help significantly to produce an image of a related seed r . Instantiating H through such a non-malleable pseudorandom generator the resulting scheme achieves NM-CPA security, where it is infeasible to convert a given ciphertext into one of a related message. Although this security notion for encryption schemes is not as strong as IND-CCA, it yet exceeds the classical IND-CPA security. That is, Bellare et al. [3] show that NM-CPA implies IND-CPA and is incomparable to IND-CCA1 security. Hence, NM-CPA security of schemes lies somewhere in between IND-CPA and IND-CCA2. 1 We also show that it is possible to extend the above result and to instantiate the H-oracle in OAEP G,H [F t-clear ] without even sacrificing IND-CCA2 security (again, for random oracle G). This however requires the very strong assumption for the pseudorandom generators which then must be non-malleable under chosen-image attacks. For such a generator non-malleability should even hold if the adversary can learn seeds of chosen images, and such generators resemble chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes already. Hence, we see this partial instantiation as a mere plausibility result that one can presumably instantiate oracle H and still have IND-CCA2 security. This is contrast to the results in [11] for example, showing that there are encryption schemes secure in the random oracle model but which cannot be securely realized for any primitive, not even for a secure encryption scheme itself.
As for the existence of non-malleable pseudorandom generators, we are not aware if they can be derived from standard cryptographic assumptions, and we leave this as an interesting open problem. We also remark that, while non-malleability under chosen-image attacks seems to be a rather synthetic property, plain nonmalleability as required in the NM-CPA result appears to be a modest and plausible assumption for typical instantiation candidates like hash functions. For instance, it should not be easy to flip bits in given hash value, affecting bits in the pre-image in a reasonable way.
Full Instantiation Result. Our main result is a standard-model security proof for a fully instantiated OAEP. It is not very reasonable to expect a proof of IND-CCA2 security of OAEP in the standard model, even assuming very strong properties of instantiating functions (although we all would like to see such result). As we mentioned above, we are not aware if one can even show IND-CPA security of fully instantiated OAEP.
Nevertheless we show that OAEP in the standard model can be proven to satisfy a rather strong notion of security notion, namely $NM-CPA. It is slightly weaker than the standard non-malleability notion NM-CPA in that there is a restriction that an unknown random message is encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. A bit more formally this security notion $NM-CPA requires that given a public key and a ciphertext of a challenge message chosen uniformly at random from a large message space it is hard to compute a valid ciphertext of a message non-trivially related to the challenge message. Note that this is consistent with how asymmetric schemes are typically used to build hybrid encryption schemes, where the key of the symmetric scheme is derived from a random string encrypted with the public-key scheme. To appreciate the power of the $NM-CPA definition we note that it implies for example the notion of OW-CPA and, moreover, Bleichenbacher's attack [7] on PKCS #1 v1.5 is not possible for $NM-CPA secure schemes.
2 Thus our result provides better evidence that OAEP resists such attacks, and specifies what properties of the instantiating functions are sufficient for this.
For our full instantiation proof we consider OAEP G,H [F lsb||t-clear ] where the t-part and the least significant bits of the s-part are output in clear. To achieve the $NM-CPA security notion under full instantiation of both oracles G and H in OAEP G,H [F lsb||t-clear ] we need to augment the near-collision resistant generator G by a trapdoor property, allowing to invert images efficiently given the trapdoor information; such generators exist if trapdoor permutations exist. We again use a non-malleable pseudorandom generator H for instantiating H. Assuming that the generators above exist we show that OAEP
We mitigate the notion of NM-CPA such that the relation specifying related messages and the distribution over the messages must be fixed at the outset. This mildly affects the relationship to the IND notions, but we omit technical details in the introduction. 2 Bleichenbacher's attack works by generating a sequence of ciphertexts from a given ciphertext and verifying validity of the derived ciphertexts by querying the decryption oracle. While requiring adaptive queries to recover the entire message, one can view the message in first derived ciphertext in such an attack as having a small (but not negligible) probability of being non-trivially related to the original (possibly random) message.
3 Very recently, Brown [2] has shown that RSA-OAEP cannot be proven OW-CPA under certain security reductions. Our approach here does not fall under this kind of reductions and does not contradict his result. We provide more details in Section 3.2.
To give further evidence of the usefulness of the $NM-CPA notion we finally show that we can derive a hybrid encryption scheme that is NM-CPA in the random oracle model from an asymmetric scheme secure in the sense of $NM-CPA. For this, one encrypts a random string r with the asymmetric scheme and then runs r through an idealized key derivation process to obtain K = G(r), modeled through a random oracle G. The actual message is then encrypted with a symmetric scheme for key K. The construction of such hybrid encryption schemes resembles the encryption method in SSL/TLS [17] . There, simply speaking, the client encrypts a random string under the server's public key and then both parties derive the actual symmetric key K by hashing the random string iteratively. If one considers this hashing step as an idealized process then our results provide a security guarantee for this technique. Observe that this result is still cast in the random oracle model; yet it separates the security of the key derivation process from the security of the asymmetric encryption scheme and can be seen as a partial instantiation for the random oracles in the encryption algorithm.
Prospect. The random oracle model should provide confidence that the design of a cryptographic scheme is sound, even if a security proof in the standard model for this scheme is missing. The heuristic argument is that "good" instantiations of random oracles then give evidence that no "clever" attacks against a scheme work. But the well-known negative results about the random oracle principle have raised some doubts how much confidence this security heuristic really gives.
The approach we take here towards challenging the doubts is to trade security goals against partial or full instantiations of random oracles. Our "test case" OAEP shows that this is a viable way and gives more insights in "how clever" attacks against the instantiations would have to be. And while this still does not rule out the possibility of extraordinary attacks we see this as an important supplement to the random oracle heuristic and to the question how instantiating candidates should be selected, hopefully inciting other results along this direction.
Preliminaries
If S is a set then x $ ← S means that the value x is chosen uniformly at random from S. If A is a deterministic (resp. randomized algorithm) with a single output then x ← A(y, z, . . . ) (resp. x $ ← A(y, z, . . . )) means that the value x is assigned the output of A for input (y, z, . . . ). An algorithm is called efficient if it runs in polynomial time in the input length (which, in our case, usually refers to polynomial time in the security parameter).
A function family
We usually identify the functions f and f −1 simply with their descriptions, and write (f,
for the random choice of f (specifying also f −1 ) from the family F (1 k ). Unless stated differently the minimal assumption about a function family in this paper is that it is one-way, and that it is efficiently computable.
The OAEP Framework
The OAEP encryption framework [5] is parameterized by integers k, k 0 and k 1 (where k 0 , k 1 are linear functions of k) and makes use of a trapdoor permutation family F with domain and range {0, 1} k and two random oracles
and H : {0,
The message space is {0,
is defined as follows:
• The key generation algorithm K(1 k ) picks a pair (f, f −1 ) ← F (1 k ) at random. Let pk specify f and let sk specify f −1 .
• The encryption algorithm E(pk, M ) picks r $ ← {0, 1} k0 , and computes s ← G(r) ⊕ (M 0 k1 ) and t ← H(s) ⊕ r. It finally outputs C ← f (s||t).
• The decryption algorithm D(sk, C) computes s t ← f −1 (C), r ← t ⊕ H(s) and M ← s ⊕ G(r). If the last k 1 bits of M are zeros, then it returns the first k − k 0 − k 1 bits of M , else it returns ⊥.
The encryption scheme OAEP G,H [F ] is IND-CCA2 secure in the RO model if the underlying trapdoor permutation family F is partial one-way [15] .
As a side effect of the partial one-wayness result for OAEP [15] we can immediately conclude security of a particular OAEP variant, where we use partial one-way trapdoor permutation family F t-clear based on a trapdoor permutation function family F . Namely, each function f t-clear : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k in F t-clear is described by f t-clear (s||t) ≡ f (s)||ID(t) = f (s)||t for a one-way permutation f : {0, 1} k−k0 → {0, 1} k−k0 , i.e., the t-part is output in clear. A random instance (f t-clear , f 
k1 this means that we output the least significant bits lsb k1 (G(r)) of G(r) and t in clear. For this reason we sometimes write s||γ instead of s and denote by γ the k 1 bits lsb k1 (G(r)) such that f lsb||t-clear (s||γ||t) = f (s)||γ||t. In both cases we often identify F t-clear resp. F lsb||t-clear simply with the underlying family F and vice versa. In particular we often denote a random function from F t-clear or F lsb||t-clear simply by f . We call F t-clear resp. F lsb||t-clear the induced family of F .
Random Oracle Instantiations. For an instantiation of the random oracle
we consider a pair of efficient algorithms G = (KGenG, G) where KGenG on input 1 k returns a random key K and the deterministic algorithm 4 G maps this key K and input r ∈ {0, 1} k0 to an output string
for the encryption scheme which works as defined above, but where the key pair (sk, pk) is now given by sk = (f −1 , K) and pk = (f, K) and where each evaluation of G(r) is replaced by G K (r). We say that 
Security of Encryption Schemes
In this section we review the relevant security notions for asymmetric encryption schemes AS = (K, E, D). In addition to indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2) -see Appendix A for formal definitions-we occasionally also rely on the notions of non-malleability. This notion was introduced and formalized in [14, 3] . The most basic version is called NM-CPA and says that a ciphertext of a message M * should not help to find a ciphertext of a related message M , where the distribution of message M * is defined by an efficient distribution M and related messages are specified by an efficient relation R, both chosen by the adversary. Definition 2.1 (NM-CPA) Let AS be an asymmetric encryption scheme. Then AS is called secure in the sense of NM-CPA if for for every efficient algorithm A the following random variables Exp
It is assumed that the messages in the support of M have equal length.
We note that the original definition of NM-CPA in [3] actually allows the adversary to output a vector of ciphertexts. Our results for OAEP merely hold with respect to binary relations and therefore we restrict the definition here to such relations. We remark that the aforementioned relationships of NM-CPA to the indistinguishability notions, e.g., that this notion is strictly stronger than the one of IND-CPA, hold for relations of arity two as well.
We define a weaker security notion is that of $NM-CPA where the adversary does not have the ability to choose a distribution over the messages, but where a random message is encrypted and the adversary tries to find a ciphertext of a related message.
be an asymmetric encryption scheme and let M for input 1 k describe the uniform distribution over all (k) bit strings for some polynomial . Then AS is called secure in the sense of $NM-CPA if for for every efficient algorithm A and for every efficient relation R the following random variables Exp
While the notion of $NM-CPA is weaker than the one of NM-CPA -in addition to the restriction to uniformly distributed messages the relation is now fixed in advance-it yet suffices for example to show security in the sense of OW-CPA (where the adversary's goal is to recover a random message in a given ciphertext) and it also covers Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5. In Section 5 we also show that the notion of $NM-CPA is enough to derive NM-CPA security under an idealized key derivation function. Namely, one encrypts a random string r under the $NM-CPA public-key encryption scheme and then pipes r through a random oracle G to derive a key K = G(r) for the symmetric scheme. In fact, one can view the SSL encryption method where the client sends an encrypted random key to the server and both parties derive a symmetric key through a complicated hash function operation as a special case of this method. Then this result about lifting $NM-CPA to NM-CPA security, together with the $NM-CPA security proof for the full instantiation of OAEP lsb||t-clear , provides an interesting security heuristic (as long as the key derivation process behaves in an ideal way).
Pseudorandom Generators
Typically, the minimal expected requirement when instantiating a random oracle is that the instantiating function describes a pseudorandom generator, consisting of the key generation algorithm KGen producing a public key K and the evaluation algorithm G mapping a random seed r with key K to the pseudorandom output. Usually the output of this generator should still look random when some side information hint(r) about the seed r is given. This probabilistic function hint must be of course uninvertible, a weaker notion than one-wayness (cf. [10] ).
We also incorporate into the definition the possibility that the key generation algorithm outputs some secret trapdoor information K −1 in addition to K. Given this information K −1 one can efficiently invert images. If this trapdoor property is not required we can assume that K −1 = ⊥ and often omit K −1 in the key generator's output. Definition 2.3 ((Trapdoor) Pseudorandom Generator) Let KGen be an efficient key-generation algorithm that takes as input 1 k for k ∈ N and outputs a key K; let G be an efficient deterministic evaluation algorithm that, on input K and a string r ∈ {0, 1} k returns a string of length (k). Then G = (KGen, G) is called a pseudorandom generator (with respect to hint) if the following random variables are computationally indistinguishable:
Furthermore, if there is an efficient algorithm TdG such that for any k ∈ N, any (K,
For our results about OAEP we often need further properties from the pseudorandom generator, including near-collision resistance and non-malleability. The former means that given a seed r it is hard to find a different seed r such that G(K, r) and G(K, r ) coincide on a predetermined set of bits (even if they are allowed to differ on the other bits). Non-malleability refers to generators where the generator's output for a seed should not help to produce an image of a related seed. We give precise definitions and details concerning existential questions on site.
Partial Instantiations for OAEP
In this section we prove security of partial instantiations of OAEP. Our results show that one can replace either one of the random oracle in OAEP by reasonable primitives and still maintain security (in the random oracle model).
Instantiating the G-Oracle for IND-CCA2 security
We first show how to construct a pseudorandom generator with a special form of collision-resistance. This property says that finding an input r to a random input r, such that G(K, r) and G(K, r ) coincide on the k least significant bits lsb k (G(K, r)), lsb k (G(K, r )), is infeasible. According to comparable collision types for hash functions [6] we call this near-collision resistance. 
Near-collision resistant generators can be built, for example, from one-way permutations via the wellknown Yao-Blum-Micali construction [21, 8] . In that case, given a family G of one-way permutations the key generation algorithm KGen YBM (1 k ) of this generator simply picks a random instance g :
, and G YBM (g, r) = (hb(r), hb(g(r)), . . . , hb(g n−1 (r)), g n (r)) is defined through the hardcore bits hb of g. Since g is a permutation different inputs r = r yield different output parts g n (r) = g n (r ). Given a near-collision resistant pseudorandom generator we show how to instantiate the G-oracle in OAEP G,H [F t-clear ] for the family F t-clear which is induced by a trapdoor permutation family F (i.e., where a member f : {0, 1} k−k0 → {0, 1} k−k0 of F is applied to the k-bit inputs such that the lower k 0 bits are output in clear).
Theorem 3.2 Let G = (KGenG, G) be a pseudorandom generator which is near-collision resistant (for the k 1 least significant bits). Let F be trapdoor permutation family and let F t-clear be the induced partial oneway trapdoor permutation family defined in Section 2.1. Then the partial G-instantiation
The full proof appears in Appendix B. The idea is to gradually change the way the challenge ciphertext (encrypting one of two adversarially chosen messages, the hidden choice made at random) is computed in a sequence of games. We show that each of these steps does not change an adversary's success probability of predicting the secret choice noticeably:
• Initially, in Game 0 the challenge ciphertext f (s * )||t * for message M * is computed as in the scheme's description by s
k1 for the near-collision resistant generator G and t * = H(s * ) ⊕ r * for random oracle H.
• In Game 1 the ciphertext is now computed by setting s
k1 as before, but letting t * = ω ⊕ r * for a random ω which is independent of H(s * ). Because H is a random oracle this will not affect the adversary's success probability, except for the rare case that the adversary queries H about s * .
• In Game 2 , in a rather cosmetic change, we further substitute t * = ω ⊕ r * simply for t * = ω, making the t-part independent of the generator's pre-image r * .
• in Game 3 we use the pseudorandomness of generator G to replace s
Since ciphertexts in the last game are distributed independently of the actual message security of the original scheme follows, after a careful analysis that decryption queries do not help; this is the step where we exploit that H is still a random oracle and that G is near-collision resistant. Namely, the near-collision resistance prevents an adversary from transforming the challenge ciphertext for values r * , s * into a valid one for the same s * but a different r; otherwise the least significant bits of s
would not coincide and the derived ciphertext would be invalid with high probability. Given this, the adversary must always use a "fresh" value s when submitting a ciphertext to the decryption oracle, and must have queried the random oracle H about s before (or else the ciphertext is most likely invalid). But then the adversary already "knows" r = t ⊕ H(s) -recall that for F t-clear the t-part is included in clear in ciphertexts-and therefore "knows" the (padded) message M ||z = s ⊕ G(K, r) encapsulated in the ciphertext.
Instantiating the H-Oracle
To instantiate the H-oracle we introduce the notion of a non-malleable pseudorandom generator. For such a pseudorandom generator it should be infeasible to find for a given image y * = H K (s * ) of a random s * a different image y = H K (s) of a related value s, where the corresponding efficient relation R(s * , s) must be determined before seeing K and y * . 5 More precisely, we formalize non-malleability of a pseudorandom generator by the indistinguishability of two experiments. For any adversary B it should not matter whether B is given f (s * ),
for an independent s instead: the probability that B outputs f (s) and y = H K (s) such that s is related to s * via relation R should be roughly the same in both cases.
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Definition 3.3 (Non-Malleable Pseudorandom Generator) Assume H = (KGenH, H) is a pseudorandom generator (which is pseudorandom with respect to hint(x) = (f, f (x)) for (f, f −1 ) ← F (1 k ) from the trapdoor function family F ). Then H is called non-malleable with respect to hint if for any efficient algorithm B and any efficient relation R the following random variables Exp
H,B,F,R (k) are computationally indistinguishable, where the experiments are defined as follows.
Given a non-malleable pseudorandom generator we can prove NM-CPA security of the partial H-instantiation of OAEP, under the restriction that the adversarial chosen message distribution and relation are defined at the beginning of the attack via (M, R, state) ← A(1 k ) and thus depend only the security parameter. This relaxed notion still implies for example IND-CPA security (but for messages picked independently of the public key), is still incomparable to IND-CCA1 security, and also thwarts Bleichenbacher's attack. We call such schemes NM-CPA for pre-defined message distributions and relations.
Theorem 3.4 Let F be a trapdoor permutation family and let F t-clear be the induced partial one-way trapdoor permutation family. Let H = (KGenH, H) be a pseudorandom generator (with respect to hint(
Assume further that H is non-malleable with respect to hint. Then the partial H-
through H is NM-CPA for pre-defined message distributions and relations in the random oracle model.
The proof idea is as follows. Assume that an attacker, given a ciphertext for some values r * , s * (which uniquely define the message in a ciphertext), tries to prepare a related ciphertext for some value r = r * , without having queried random oracle G about r before. Then such a ciphertext is most likely invalid because with overwhelming probability the least significant bits of s ⊕ G(r) are not zero. Else, if r = r * , then we must have f (s) = f (s * ) and s = s * , since the adversarial ciphertext must be different for a successful attack. But then the values H(K, s * ) and H(K, s) for different pre-images must be related via the ciphertext's relation, contradicting the non-malleability of the generator H. In any other case, if r = r * and r is among the queries to G, the random value G(r * ) is independent of G(r). So must be the messages M * ||0 k1 = s * ⊕ G(r * ) and M ||0 k1 = s ⊕ G(r), as required for non-malleability. Details can be found in Appendix C. Replacing the H-oracle without violating IND-CCA2 security is more ambitious and we require a very strong assumption on the pseudorandom generator, called non-malleability under chosen-image attacks (where the adversary can also make inversion queries to the trapdoor pseudorandom generator). Since any pseudorandom generator with this property is already close to a chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme, we rather see this as an indication that a partial instantiation might be possible and that separation results as [11, 18, 19, 1, 16, 20, 9, 13] seem to be hard to find. The formal treatment of the following and the proof appear in Appendix D Theorem 3.5 Let F be trapdoor permutation family and let F t-clear be the induced partial one-way trapdoor permutation family defined in Section 2.1. Let H = (KGenH, H, TdH) be a trapdoor pseudorandom generator which is non-malleable under chosen-image attacks (with respect to hint(
in the random oracle model.
Full Instantiation for OAEP
In this section we prove that there exists a full instantiation of OAEP lsb||t-clear which is secure in the sense of $NM-CPA in the standard model, implying for example that the scheme is OW-CPA. Recall that in OAEP lsb||t-clear we write s||γ = G(s) ⊕ M ||0 k1 instead of s to name the least significant bits explicitly. To prove our result we need a near-collision resistant trapdoor pseudorandom generator, i.e., which combines near-collision resistance with the trapdoor property. Such generators can be easily built by using again the Blum-Micali-Yao generator, but this time by deploying a trapdoor permutation g instead of a one-way permutation, i.e., the generator's output for random r is given by G YBM (g, r) = (hb(r), hb(g(r)), . . . , hb(g n−1 (r)), g n (r)).
Letting K −1 contain the trapdoor information g −1 algorithm TdG can easily invert the k 1 least significant bits y of the output to recover a pre-image r.
To be precise we make use of two additional, specific properties of the Blum-Micali-Yao generator. First, we assume that recovering a pre-image is possible given the k 1 least significant bits only, i.e., without seeing the remaining part of the image. To simplify the proof we furthermore presume that the k 1 least significant bits of the generator's output are statistically close to uniform (over the choice of the seed). 7 We simply refer to generators with the above properties as a near-collision resistant trapdoor pseudorandom generator (for the least significant k bits).
Theorem 4.1 Let F be trapdoor permutation family and let F lsb||t-clear be the induced partial one-way trapdoor permutation family. Let G = (KGenG,
The proof appears in Appendix E. The basic idea is similar to the one of NM-CPA security for the partial H-instantiation. The important difference is that the randomness of the encrypted message M in a ciphertext f (s)||γ||t for s||γ = G K (r) ⊕ M ||0 k1 helps to overcome otherwise existing "circular" dependencies between G and H in the computations of ciphertexts (which, in the partial instantiation case, do not occur due to the fact that G is a random oracle).
Hybrid Encryption from $NM-CPA Schemes
We show that a public-key scheme which is secure in the sense of $NM-CPA (i.e., for pre-defined relations), together with an IND-CCA2 secure symmetric scheme suffices to build a NM-CPA secure hybrid scheme in the random oracle model (i.e., even for adaptively chosen message distributions and relations).
Construction 5.1 Let AS = (EK asym , E asym , D asym ) be an asymmetric encryption scheme and let SS = (EK sym , E sym , D sym ) be a symmetric encryption scheme. Let G be a hash function mapping k-bit strings into the key space of the symmetric scheme. Then the hybrid encryption scheme AS = (EK asym , E asym , D asym ) is defined as follows.
• The key generation algorithm EK asym (1 k ) outputs a key pair (sk, pk)
• The encryption algorithm E asym on input pk, M picks r
and returns (C asym , C sym ).
• The decryption algorithm D asym on input (C asym , C sym ) and sk computes r ← D asym (sk, C asym ), M ← D sym (G(r), C sym ) and returns M .
Theorem 5.2 Let AS = (EK asym , E asym , D asym ) be an asymmetric encryption scheme which is $NM-CPA. Let SS = (EK sym , E sym , D sym ) be an IND-CCA2 symmetric encryption scheme. Let G be a hash function and assume AS = (EK asym , E asym , D asym ) is the hybrid encryption scheme defined according to Construction 5.1. Then AS is NM-CPA secure in the random oracle model.
The proof is in Appendix F and actually shows that the scheme is NM-CPA with respect to the stronger notion where the adversary outputs a sequence C = (C 1 , . . . , C m ) of ciphertexts and the success is measured according to R(M * , M) for M = (M 1 , . . . , M m ).
[ 
A Encryption Schemes and their Security
An asymmetric encryption scheme AE = (K, E, D) is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms with the following functionalities. The randomized key-generation algorithm K takes input 1 k , where k is the security parameter, and outputs a pair (pk, sk) consisting of a public key and a matching secret key, respectively. The randomized encryption algorithm E takes input a public key pk and a message M , and outputs a ciphertext C. The deterministic decryption algorithm D takes input a secret key sk and a ciphertext C, and outputs a message M or a special symbol ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext is invalid. Associated to k is a message space MsgSp(k) from which M is allowed to be drawn. For any (pk, sk)
The syntax of symmetric encryption schemes is very similar, except the same symmetric key K is used in place of public and secret keys (pk = sk = K) and the adversary is denied the key K. (k) associated to AE, a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and an adversary A. In both experiments A is given input a public key pk and access to a left-right encryption oracle O AE (pk, b, ·, ·), where pk and sk are matching keys generated via (pk, sk) 
is negligible in k.
IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of symmetric encryption schemes is defined similarly, except that adversary is not given any key.
We adopt the convention that the time complexity of adversary A is the execution time of the entire experiment, including the time taken for key generation, and computation of answers to oracle queries. The same convention will be used implicitly in other definitions of the paper.
B Proof of Theorem 3.2
In this section we present the formal proof of the IND-CCA2 security of the partial instantiation of G through a near-collision resistant pseudorandom generator.
Let A be an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Let Game 
A,b (k) we furthermore replace the value G(K, r) by a independent random string u * ← {0, 1} k−k0 in the challenge ciphertext. All games are described formally in Figure B . 
Note that in Game 3
A,b the distribution of the data is independent of bit b. Hence, the probabilities Pr Game Simulating the Decryption Oracle. We first describe how to simulate decryption queries in the games without knowing the secret key f −1 to f . This is accomplished through the random oracle mode and via one procedure D which works for all games. In addition to a ciphertext (C, t) this procedure gets the public data K, f and a list L H , representing A's queries to random oracle H and the answers as input. The procedure checks if there is exactly one pair (s, ω) in L H such that C = f (s); if so, then it computes r ← t ⊕ ω and then M ||z ← s ⊕ G ncr (K, r). It finally outputs M if z = 0 k1 . In any other case, if there is no unique entry in L H or if z = 0 k1 then it returns ⊥. We next prove that this decryption procedure may substitute the actual decryption oracle except with negligible simulation error probability in all games. More formally, this means that for every decryption request in the game we run D (on the list L H of communication between A and H up to this point) instead of D. Let DecError i denote the event that D returns a different answer than D for the i-th decryption query in the corresponding game, given that the first i − 1 replies were identical. It then suffices to show that the probability of DecError i is negligible for arbitrary i. Recall that we call a ciphertext valid iff D returns a message M = ⊥.
First note that collisions (s, ω), (s , ω) for different s = s in the list L H are unlikely and happen with negligible probability only at any point. This holds in all games, because the values ω are picked at random. So we can condition on the event that there are no such collision and analyze Pr [ DecError i ] under this condition, i.e., it suffices to discuss the case of missing entries in L H , as this is the only case when D's behavior diverges; if there is a unique entry in L H then D gives the same answer as the genuine decryption oracle.
Behavior in Game Zero. Assume that A submits some (C, t) to the decryption oracle with the i-th query in Game • If we are in the first phase of the game, before A receives the challenge ciphertext, and there is no value for s in L H , then r = H(s) ⊕ t is an unknown random value. The probability that the least significant bits of G(K, r) ⊕ s equal 0 k1 is therefore negligibly close to 2 −k1 by the pseudorandomness of G. Else it would be easy to construct a distinguisher.
• If we are in the second phase, after having received the challenge ciphertext, and C = C * , then we have s = s * and H(s) is again an unknown random value for which the same argument as for the first phase applies.
• If we are in the second phase and C = C * and thus s = s * but t = t * , then we have r = r * as well. The equation
k1 implies the equation lsb k1 (G(K, r)) ⊕ lsb k1 (G(K, r * )) = z and in order for the actual decryption oracle to decrypt to a valid message, the least significant bits z must be zero. But the probability of finding such r * is negligible by the near-collision resistance (otherwise it would be easy to construct a successful collision finder).
Hence, the probability of event DecError i in Game 0 A,b is negligible and D simulates D correctly with overwhelming probability.
Behavior in Games One, Two and Three. We address D's behavior in experiment Game 1 A,b . This case is even easier as the challenge ciphertext is now independent of H. That is, if the adversary submits a ciphertext (C, t) to the decryption oracle, without having queried H about s = f −1 (C) before, then r = t ⊕ H(s) is an unknown random value. Hence, as in Game 0 A,b , the probability that the least significant bits of G(K, r) equal those of s is negligible. The same argument also applies to Game by a negligible probability only. The only difference between the games occurs if A at some point queries H about the value s * used in the challenge ciphertext (else the experiments are identical from A' viewpoint). Assume towards contradiction that this probability was non-negligible. Then we construct an algorithm B b (for fixed bit b), refuting the one-wayness of trapdoor permutation family k1 ), and uses t * = ω * instead of t * = H(s * ) ⊕ r. We discuss that if the probability of A asking H about f −1 (C * ) drops significantly in this simulation, i.e., from noticeable in experiment Game A,b up to the H-query perfectly 9 (since t * = ω * is also uniformly distributed, like t * = H(f −1 (C * )) ⊕ r for the unknown hash value). Hence, D b outputs 1 with noticeable probability. If, on the other hand, u is truly random, then f −1 (C * ) has the same distribution as the random X and D b would output 1 (namely, if A queries H) with negligible probability only. This would yield a contradiction to the pseudorandomness of G.
Overall it follows that B b inverts f on Y with noticeable probability, in contradiction to the one-wayness of F . Therefore, our assumption about A querying H about f −1 (C * ) with noticeable probability in Game
must have been wrong. But then A*s output behavior cannot change noticeably in the two games.
Comparing Games One and Two. Note that replacing t * = ω * ⊕ r by t * = ω * cannot change A's output behavior at all.
Comparing Games Two and Three. If the adversary's output probability would change noticeably between the two games because of the substitution of G(K, r) by u, then this would contradict the pseudorandomness of G. Namely, construct a distinguisher D b as in the previous case, but this time D b on input K, u runs the simulation till the end (including generation of the challenge ciphertext from u), and finally copies A's output. If u was pseudorandom then D b 's output is almost identical (except for the negligible error in simulating decryption queries) to Game 
C Proof of Theorem 3.4
In this section we show that the partial instantiation of the H-oracle in OAEP through a non-malleable pseudorandom generator yields NM-CPA security (for pre-defined message distributions and relations).
Let A be an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm attacking the encryption scheme in a NM-CPA scenario. As in the previous proof we consider a sequence of games where the fixed bit b ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the ciphertext encrypts message M * (b = 0) or the independent message M (b = 1).
• Let Game • In Game A,b (k) we restrict A's access to random oracle G such that queries about the value r * in the challenge ciphertext are answered with ⊥ instead (we write G − {r * } for this oracle).
• In Game A,b (k) we change the output of the experiment if A returns a ciphertext C = f (s)||t such that the corresponding r value is different from r * , yet A has not asked oracle G − {r * } about r before; in that case we set the experiment's output to 0.
• In Game 3 A,b (k) we further restrict the experiment's output, and define the output to be 0 if the adversary outputs a ciphertext with value r = r * (and without having asked G − {r * } about r, of course).
• In Game Comparing Games Zero and One. We show that the probability that A asks G about r * in experiment Game It is clear that if A's probability of querying G about r * would drop from noticeable to negligible in the case of a random u * then D b would successfully distinguish pseudorandom and random inputs with respect to hint(s * ) = (f, f (s * )). Hence A must also have noticeable success probability in the case of random u * . But for such a random u * the value t * = u * ⊕ r * hides r * information-theoretically, and the probability that the i-th query to G equals r * (given that the first i − 1 queries were all different from r * ) is at most 1/(2 k0 − i − 1). Therefore A's overall success probability remains negligible since the number of queries is polynomially bounded, contradicting our initial assumption.
Comparing Games One and Two. The only difference between the two games lies in the case where A outputs a ciphertext f (s)||t, implicitly specifying M, r, such that r = r * and A has never asked G − {r * } about r. But then G(r) is an unknown random value and the probability that the k 1 least significant bits of G(r) ⊕ M ||0 k1 equal those of s is at most 2 −k1 . We can thus neglect the contribution of this event to the output, without losing more than a negligible amount.
Comparing Games Two and Three. We claim that the probability of A outputting a ciphertext of a related message for r = r * is negligible. This follows from the non-malleability of H and the pseudorandomness of H. Namely, in a first step we can replace the pair (f (s * ), H K (s * )) in the computation of the challenge ciphertext by a pair (f (s * ), H K (s )) for an independent s . As we will describe below, by the non-malleability of H the success probability of A for r = r * will not change significantly. Then, due to the pseudorandomness of H we can replace H K (s ) by a pseudorandom value u . But then r * is information-theoretically hidden from A and the probability that A outputs a valid ciphertext for r = r * is negligible (and so must be the initial probability). Note that pseudorandomness of H alone does not guarantee this but that some kind of non-malleability is necessary (cf. [9] ).
We next formalize the above ideas. In Game 2 A (k) denote by SameRnd the event that A outputs a ciphertext f (s)||t such that f (s)||t = E pk (M ; r) is a valid ciphertext for M but different from f (s * )||t * , r = r * and
if r = r * and r / ∈ AskG then
if (r = r * and r / ∈ AskG) or r = r * then return 0
Compute ciphertext (C * , t * ):
Let r be such that C||t = E(pk, M ; r) if (r = r * and r / ∈ AskG) or r = r * then return 0 else return R(M * , M ) R A (M * , M ) = 1 for the pre-defined relation R A . Now consider the probability of event SameRnd when we slightly change the experiment by tweaking the computation of the challenge ciphertext f (s * )||t * for t * = H K (s * ) ⊕ r * as follows. We instead pick an independent s and compute t * as t * = H K (s ) ⊕ r * (but keep the value f (s * )). Denote the corresponding experiment by Game 2 A,b (k) and the event by SameRnd . We claim that the probability of SameRnd in the altered game changes only negligibly, due to the nonmalleability of H. Specifically, construct the following algorithm B b from A, executing either Game Since we consider the case of a pre-defined distributions M and relations R A in A's attack we can specify a pre-defined relation R B based on M and R A as follows: This relation works by simulating A's program in the first phase, up to the step where A outputs M, R and state. The description of the relation includes all random oracle queries made by A and the answers (including the pre-selected value r * ), the descriptions of M and R as well as state and the fixed bit b, and two random messages
This algorithm B b gets as input a tuple (f, f (s
. It also receives the description of the relation R B , including the random oracle queries to G − {r * } and the values r * , M * , M . Algorithm B b starts a black-box simulation of A for input (f, K) and state as well as f (s * )||t * for t * = y ⊕ r * ; algorithm B b also When the encryption attacker A finally outputs f (s)||t we let B b output f (s), t ⊕ r * . For the analysis consider first the case that B b 's input y equals H K (s * ). It is easy to see that B b perfectly simulates A's view in Game 
Furthermore, for r = r * the values s, s * and thus the ciphertexts must be different. Hence B b 's attack returns 1 with the same probability as SameRnd in Game 2 A,b (k) occurs. Now consider the case that y equals H K (s ) for an independent value s . As above it follows that B b 's attack returns 1 with the same probability as SameRnd in Game The final step is to observe that the probability of SameRnd in Game 2 A,b (k) is negligible. This is because the distribution of the challenge ciphertext is now completely independent of r * and we can thus think of r * as drawn only after A has output the valid ciphertext f (s)||t. But the probability of r = r * is at most 2 −k0 in this case. It follows that the probability of event SameRnd in Game
D Instantiating the H-Oracle for IND-CCA2 Security
In this section we show that the partial instantiation of H achieves IND-CCA2 security, as long as the instantiating pseudorandom generator is non-malleable under chosen-image attacks (i.e., where the adversary is allowed to make inversion queries to the trapdoor pseudorandom generator):
is a trapdoor pseudorandom generator (which is pseudorandom with respect to hint( Experiment Exp
Although it seems to be moot to plug in a "chosen-ciphertext secure" function to obtain a chosen-ciphertext encryption scheme, our goal is to show that one can instantiate the random oracle in principle, providing a possibly non-optimized feasibility result. As the counterexamples show such results are far from trivial, e.g., the CGH encryption scheme [11] in the random oracle model cannot be instantiated with any function, not even with a secure encryption scheme.
We now prove Theorem 3.5 stating that the partial H-instantiation through a pseudorandom generator which is non-malleable under chosen-image attacks is IND-CCA2:
Proof of Theorem 3.5: The proof follows similar to the one of the IND-CCA2 secure G-instantiation.
That is, for an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A we let Game A,b (k)). All games are described formally in Figure D . We remark that we use the chosen-image pseudorandomness of H for showing that the adversarial behavior in the two games cannot differ significantly.
Compute s It again suffices to show that Pr Game Simulating the Decryption Oracle. We again first describe how to simulate decryption queries in the games without knowing the secret key f −1 to f . This is accomplished through the random oracle model and via one procedure D which works for all games. In addition to a ciphertext (C, t) this procedure gets the public data K, f and a list L G , representing A's queries to random oracle G and the answers as input. The procedure also gets access to the function TdH(K −1 , ·), initialized with the matching secret key K −1 to K. To answer a decryption request (C, t) procedure D browses through each entry (r, ω) in the list L G and does the following (where (C * , t * ) denotes the challenge ciphertext):
• Compute h = t ⊕ r and submit h to TdH(K −1 , ·).
• Check if the answer s matches C, i.e., if f (s) = C. If so, compute M ||z = s ⊕ ω.
• If z = 0 k1 then return M .
• In any other case, if there is no matching entry (r, ω), or if there is one but z = 0 k1 , then D returns ⊥.
Note that D never puts a G-query during this procedure. Observe also that, if there is a corresponding entry in L G , then it is unique.
We next prove that this decryption procedure may substitute the actual decryption oracle except with negligible simulation error probability in all games. More formally, this means that for every decryption request in the game we run D (on the list L G of communication between A and G up to this point) instead of D. Let DecError i denote the event that D returns a different answer than D for the i-th decryption query in the corresponding game, given that the first i−1 replies were identical. It then suffices to show that the probability of DecError i is negligible for arbitrary i. Recall that we call a ciphertext valid iff D returns a message M = ⊥.
In the next step we replace the value H(K, s ) by a truly random value u * and we again show that this cannot affect A's probability of querying G about r * noticeably. Suppose again that this was not the case and that the probability would drop to negligible. Then we construct a successful distinguisher D b against the pseudorandomness of H. when we use H(K, s ). Namely, up to the point where A queries G about r * the value G(r * ) ⊕ M b ||0 k1 is random, as is s * . Hence, the adversary's view in this simulation is identical to the one in the game. Overall, D outputs 1 in this case with noticeable probability. If D's input y * , on the other hand, is truly random, then the probability of returning 1 drops to negligible by assumption. But then D would successfully distinguish the two cases, contradicting the pseudorandomness of H.
We conclude that A's probability of asking r * to G if we replace G(r * ) and H(K, s * ) by random elements ω * , u * must remain noticeable. However, since r * in information-theoretically hidden in the challenge ciphertext with these substitutions, the probability can only be 2 −k0 . This yields a contradiction to our initial assumption about A asking G about r * in Game 0 A,b with noticeable probability. As discussed, this implies that D also works in Game We conclude that the encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 in the RO model.
E Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let A be an attacker on the $NM-CPA property and R A be a relation. Once more we look at a sequence of games Game for uniform messages distributions. The games are described formally in Figure E . Informally, the differences between the games is as follows:
• As mentioned before, Game . That is, for b = 0 the adversary gets a ciphertext f (s * )||γ * ||t * of message M * with γ * = lsb k1 (G(KG, r * )) and t * = H(KH, s * ||γ * ) ⊕ r * and tries to find a ciphertext f (s)||γ||t of a related message M . For b = 1 the adversary sees a ciphertext of an independent message M instead.
• In the next experiment Game 1 A,R A ,b (k) we replace the computation of H KH (s * ||γ * ) in the challenge ciphertext by an evaluation for an independent s ||γ . That is, the challenge ciphertext is of the form f (s * )||γ * ||H KH (s ||γ ) ⊕ r * .
• In Game 2 A,R A ,b (k) we then substitute the value H KH (s ||y ) by the evaluation of a truly random element u such that the challenge ciphertext equals f (s * )||γ * ||u ⊕ r * .
• We finally replace the value G KG (r * ) in the challenge ciphertext by a random element v * .
Proceeding from Game
A,R A ,b (k) for fixed bit b we show that A's success probability cannot change noticeably. But in the final game the challenge ciphertext is independent of the message and the experiments Game Comparing Games Zero and One. Recall that the difference between experiments Game 0 A,b (k) and Game 1 A,b (k) is that we replace the value H KH (s * ||γ * ) by H KH (s ||γ ) for an independent s ||γ . We show that the non-malleability of H guarantees that the output of Game is valid then this works again) . B b then outputs f (s)||γ, t ⊕ r.
For the analysis note that r = r * implies γ = lsb k1 (G(KG, r)) = γ * = lsb k1 (G(KG, r * )) with overwhelming probability; else B b 's values r, r * would contradict the near-collision resistance in a straightforward way (where one would use f −1 to decrypt the adversarial ciphertext such that knowledge of KG −1 is not necessary). But then the pre-images s||γ and s * ||γ * must be different, as required for a success in the non-malleability attack. Similarly, if r = r * then we must have s = s * else the ciphertext returned by A would be equal to the challenge ciphertext.
Furthermore, if A's ciphertext is valid then B b generates a valid pair f (s)||γ, H KH (s||γ) from A's output. Hence, the probability that B b 's attack returns 1 for given y * = H KH (s * ||γ * ) is negligibly close to the probability that Game Comparing Games Two and Three. The indistinguishability of the two games follows again by a distinguisher against the pseudorandomness, this time, however, against G. We omit a formal description since the construction of the algorithm is similar to the previous case and is straightforward noting that the distribution of t * = u ⊕ r * in Game 2 A,b (k) can be replaced by a random u instead. This proves that the scheme is $NM-CPA.
F Proof of Theorem 5.2
Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm attacking NM-CPA security of the hybrid scheme AS . Below we prove the more general result saying that the scheme is still NM-CPA if the adversary outputs a vector of ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 , . . . . For this we consider again a sequence of games, formally described in Figure F . such that the starting game corresponds to A's attack scenario in the experiment Exp • Game 1 A,b describes the game where we let the random oracle G return the undefined symbol ⊥ if queried about r * encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. We denote this oracle by G − {r * }.
